Ministry of External Affairs Government of India

The Emergence of Eurasia

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  By: Amb (Retd) Shyam Saran
  Venue: South Asian University, New Delhi
  Date: August 23, 2018
  

The Emergence of Eurasia

When speaking about Eurasia the challenge is to define the geography that we wish to focus on. I will use the more expansive definition, which goes back to strategists like Mackinder, who in 1904 called the land mass between the Atlantic and the Pacific, but girded in the south by the Himalayas and by the Arctic tundra in the north, as the world island or Eurasia. The domination of the core of this Eurasian landmass, comprising mainly of East Europe, which he called the "heartland” would be the key to world domination. Mackinder encapsulated his geopolitical theory in the following dictum:

"Who rules Eastern Europe commands the heartland; who rules the heartland commands the World Island; who commands the World Island commands the world.”

This harked back to the empires of yore such as the Mongol empire which straddled both continents and enabled the old Silk Roads-and there were many-delivering relative peace and security, although short-lived. Then came the maritime age in the 15th century, when long distance sea travel became possible, and littoral powers at the periphery of the old Eurasia, became dominant, controlling the new sea lines of communication criss-crossing the world’s oceans. Unlike Mackinder the U.S. strategist Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan held that the control of the maritime domain would be the key to empire-building in the new age. Other scholars went further. Spikeman who taught at the Yale University propounded a Rimland theory, which accepted the centrality of Eurasia but claimed that its mastery depended on the control of its oceanic rim on the Atlantic and the Pacific. His dictum-"Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; he who controls Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.”

This is, of course, a very American-centric perspective.

But the Second World War demonstrated that both land armies as well as naval power were critical in any power contestation as were regional theatres spread across the globe.

The profile of Eurasia diminished when it was practically partitioned between East and West during the Cold War, disrupting the age old links which bound the region together and the gentle mergings of different parts of the region were now separated by political, ideological and military barriers.

• The end of the Cold War set into motion the gradual dismantling of these barriers. At the same time, the region gained importance as the treasure of valuable resources, including oil and gas and uranium. China’s emergence as a major economic and military power in the past 3 decades, and its westward expansion, has enhanced the role of Central Asia and Eastern Europe as corridors linking it to the markets of the West. There is little doubt that this region will play a more important geopolitical role during this century. Russia continues to be a major actor in this space and this is likely to bring it into a more visible contestation with China both in Central Asia and East Europe. Initiatives such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States are aimed at retaining its influence in a region which constituted the old Soviet Union and which it still regards as its extended neighbourhood.
• What needs to be appreciated is that we are not about to enter the geopolitical landscape that Mackinder had spelt out in the 19th century. Maritime power has not diminished in importance. In fact, more than 90% of the world’s trade is still sea-borne and this is unlikely to change anytime soon particularly for bulk shipments. Oil and gas pipelines criss-crossing the Eurasian landmass are gaining in importance but where will they be in a future likely to be fossil-fuel free? And if the melting of the Arctic ice makes shipping between Asia and Europe much shorter and swifter, what impact would this have on the land corridors already in place and now being built including under China’s BRI initiative? In sum, I believe that the sources of geopolitical power and pre-eminence will require both its maritime as well as land dimension with the former retaining its salience.
• The rising political and economic profile of Eurasia demands an effective security framework to safeguard its valuable resource assets and the corridors which provide the infrastructure for its sustained development and prosperity. What are the likely security challenges in the region? From India’s perspective cross-border terrorism and the spread of religious fundamentalism, under, for example, the Islamic State( IS), in several countries of the region need to be addressed urgently. The continuing civil war in Afghanistan may destabilize the entire region. Its political stability and economic recovery is our common responsibility. The region is a victim of drug trafficking and the new transport corridors are also potential transmission belts for the expanding drug trade. The corridors themselves traverse vast distances and lightly populated areas. Policing them is a huge challenge. And lastly, the resurgence of nationalistic sentiment and the backlash against globalisation, threatens to bring back barriers again interrupting international supply chains, disrupting trade and investment flows and even people to people contacts. These challenges can only be met through closer regional cooperation based on dialogue, on mutual respect and putting in place multilateral institutions and arrangements where each stake-holder has a role and responsibility.
  
  There are several regional bodies that have begun to play a role in this regard, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, of which India has recently become a member. India’s Connect Central Asia policy folds very well into its membership of the SCO as does its participation in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) which is a multi-modal network linking India through the Iranian port of Chahbahar to the Caspian Sea and thereafter to Russia and Northern Europe. This could link up with the East-West transport corridors that are connecting Russia and China to West European destinations.
• There is a rapid transformation taking place in the global geopolitical landscape. We are witnessing major changes on both ends of Eurasia, on the Atlantic flank and its Pacific flank. The fragmentation of Europe continues and it is not certain that NATO will survive as a powerful and united military alliance that has been a fixity in world affairs since the end of the Second World War. Brexit has weakened the EU and a new divide is emerging between the older members in Western Europe and the newer members in Eastern Europe. The U.S. under Trump has downgraded the NATO alliance. U.S.-Russia relations are in flux with the recent Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki. We have also witnessed dramatic changes in East Asia, such as the expansion of Chinese economic and security power, the steady drift in Japan towards significantly advanced military capabilities and a more active foreign policy, the unprecedented Trump-Kim Jongun summit which carries both promise of peace but also risks of military conflict on account of disappointed expectations. India’s own footprint in the region is expanding through its Act East policy and the latest Indo-Pacific strategy. While the U.S. retains a formidable military presence in the region its intent as well as its future role have become uncertain. These are already triggering major changes in the security calculations of major powers like India, Japan, South Korea and Australia. ASEAN countries are also being affected by these changes and risk being marginalised. The notion of ASEAN centrality is now more an aspiration rather than reflective of reality.
• These changes on both its flanks confronts Eurasia with unpredictability and uncertainty but perhaps there are opportunities offered by these realignments to construct more inclusive security architecture and arrangements across both Europe and Asia as well as in what is now being called the Indo-Pacific. This will not be easy. The former Portuguese Minister of European Affairs, Bruno Macaes, has written a very interesting book, The Dawn of Eurasia. He describes the current situation in Eurasia as a ”more complex, multi-polar scenario made up of significant convergences and serious competitions among the principal players of the Eurasian landmass, with no single dominant power.” In addition these principal players, in particular Russia, China and the European Union, have world views and values that are competitive and this makes regional cooperation a more complex exercise. China’s role in Eurasia will also be influenced by how the situation evolves on its eastern flank. Is China’s westward expansion into Eurasia the result of its facing a geopolitical barrier in the east? Will the U.S., while downgrading its alliances, augment its forward deployments in the region? How will a country like Japan react to the new situation? What kind of choices will the ASEAN countries choose to make and what might be India’s security calculations? These are all questions which are difficult to answer while there continues to be geopolitical churn in the region. But these are developments which will impact on Eurasia and its future.
• Does the history of Eurasia have any lessons to offer? I would like to quote from John Darwin who, in his book After Tamerlane-The Global History of Empire, has made a fine survey of the history of the ebb and flow of empires in this space: "…..if there is one continuity that we should be able to glean from a long view of the past, it is Eurasia’s resistance to a uniform system, a single great ruler, or one set of rules. In that sense, we still live in Tamerlane’s shadow-or perhaps more precisely, in the shadow of his failure.”

1. What are the key takeaways?

The end of the Cold War, by dismantling the political, ideological barriers which divided Eurasia, has led to the emergence of Eurasia as a region of independent sovereign states each with its own historical and cultural identity and possessing valuable resources which attract the attention of major powers across the globe. Thanks to the dismantling of barriers, connectivity has become important and the region is being criss-crossed by new railways, highways, oil and gas pipelines and now digital links as well. Eurasia has emerged as a region of economic opportunity.

Despite these developments Eurasian transport corridors are unlikely to diminish the role of the maritime domain as the carrier of much of global trade particularly in bulk items. The importance of maritime security will remain.

The region confronts major security challenges, including religious fundamentalism, terrorism, drug trafficking and weak governance. The continuing civil war in Afghanistan is a particularly destabilising influence. There is also an incipient conflict of interest between China and Russia both in Central Asia and East Europe. The various regional institutions of consultation and cooperation have not matured enough to provide effective response to these challenges.

It is unlikely that Eurasia will emerge as a new cockpit of geopolitical contestation but will be an important component in that contestation. What happens in the western and eastern peripheries of Eurasia will continue to play a greater role in the shaping of a new global order.

Eurasia is also part of India’s extended neighbourhood with longstanding historical, cultural and trade links. However with the creation of Pakistan and China’s occupation of Tibet, these links were broken and remain interrupted. The efforts to find alternative routes through Iran are at best sub-optimal. The situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Therefore, India’s maritime links will be the more important, both on the eastern and western reaches of the Indian Ocean.