Ministry of External Affairs Government of India

Look East and Act Policy

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  By: Amb (Retd) Yogendra Kumar
  Venue: Nagaland University,Kohima
  Date: May 26, 2015
  

I am very happy to be here in your midst at the Kohima campus of the University of Nagaland to speak to you about the subject of great interest to every one of us. The University of Nagaland, set up as a Central University under an Act of Parliament, is an important intellectual centre for the region and has the potential to contribute to the discourse on India's foreign policy especially as it concerns the Southeast Asian and South Asian countries in which the north-eastern states have an important role to play. I, also, want to thank the public diplomacy division of the Ministry of external affairs to ask me to speak to you under the Ministry’s Distinguished Lecture Series.

What is the current status of India's ‘Look East Policy’? As you are aware, the new government of India, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has taken an important decision, soon after assumption of office, to upgrade India's policy towards South-East and East Asia from 'Look East’ to Act East' – an expression which was used first by the current external affairs Minister. This energetic, proactive policy of intensified engagement with Southeast Asian countries, was manifest in the external affairs Minister making one of her first trips abroad to the region starting with Myanmar followed by visits to Vietnam and Singapore; Prime Minister's visit to Myanmar for the India-ASEAN Summit as well as the East Asia Summit (EAS) represented the new government's firm commitment to upgrade the relationship in both economic and strategic spheres. In his address to the ASEAN Heads of State/Government, on 12 November, 2014, he spoke of the need to upgrade the trade agreement on goods as well as to formalise the FTA on services and investment; he also laid special emphasis on physical connectivity, for which he proposed a special purpose vehicle for project financing and the implementation, as well as on digital connectivity. Apart from the large measure of cooperation in various areas, he emphasised co-cooperation in security issues, including maritime security, an area of special interest to the ASEAN countries.

India's ‘Look East policy' (LEP) started with India becoming a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in in 1992 and a full dialogue partner in 1996. It, thereafter, became a member of the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) comprising 10 ASEAN members, 10 dialogue partners and seven other countries, including Pakistan, and covering CBMs and preventive diplomacy), and a participant in the post-ministerial conference (PMC), also in 1996. Since 2002, the two sides established a summit level dialogue. In 2005, India also became a founding member of the East Asia Summit (EAS) mechanism at the level of heads of state/government, along with ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. In December, 2010, India joined as a founder member of the ADMM Plus Forum (ASEAN defence ministers plus defence ministers from China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, US and the Russian Federation).

India has also been involved in the forging of two other subregional groupings involving Southeast Asian countries, the emergence of which coincided with the growing role of China vis-a-vis ASEAN. The first, in 1997, at the initiative of Thailand, called BIMSTEC, comprised Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand and to which, subsequently, in 2004, Nepal and Bhutan were also added; the organisation, also, reflected the Indian desire for bridging the SAARC countries with the ASEAN. The second initiative, in 2002, is the Ganga-Mekong Cooperation (GMC) comprising, in addition to India, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam; this was aimed at having closer relationships with the lesser developed countries in ASEAN ((with exception of Thailand) on the Mekong (Khmer for 'Mother Ganga') basin. It also needs to be added that India has subsequently upscaled its bilateral relations with the individual ASEAN and member states even as its engagement with the organisation and the related forums has greatly expanded in recent decades.

India articulation of India-ASEAN relations was made at the commemorative summit in New Delhi, on 20-21 December 2012, to mark 20 years of the dialogue and 10 years of the summit partnership. A vision statement, adopted at this summit and charting the future of collaboration, appreciated India's role in the regional peace and stability and in the other ASEAN-related forums underlining India's commitment to the centrality of the organisation in the regional architecture. The main emphasis was on expanding relations between the two sides across the board from political and security spheres (transnational crimes, counterterrorism, safety of sea lanes and maritime issues), to economic cooperation (realisation of the India-ASEAN FTA in goods, services and investment, food and energy security, cooperation in support of such subregional groups such as BIMSTEC and MGC), to socio-economic and development cooperation (people-to-people contacts, scientific exchanges, study of civilisational links, climate change, urbanisation, bridging development gaps within ASEAN, et cetera). The document urged close coordination between the Indian inter-ministerial group on ASEAN transport connectivity and the ASEAN connectivity coordination committee. In addition to the existing road connectivity plans, the vision document also talked of developing a Mekong-India Economic Corridor (MIEC) connecting the two regions through the Andaman Sea.

In 2004, the major areas identified for cooperation under the BIMSTEC grouping were trade and investment, transport and communication, energy, tourism, technology, fisheries, agriculture, public health, poverty alleviation, counterterrorism and transnational crime, environmental and natural resource management, cultural and people-to-people contacts. There is also an ADB-assisted viability study on transport infrastructure and logistics.

As far as the MGC mechanism is concerned, to the existing working groups on tourism, education, culture, communication and transportation, new areas, namely public health and pandemic management, SMEs, food security and connectivity projects with ASEAN, were added in 2012. The agreement to expeditiously work on the extension of India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway to Cambodia and Laos and on the new proposal for the development of an India-Myanmar-Laos-Vietnam-Cambodia Highway was also arrived at.

There are two more components of the international environment for the North Eastern States although they do not have a directing bearing on India's 'Act East Policy'. One is the SAARC sub-regional growth approach adopted in 1997. One of the growth regions identified comprises India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan. This initiative has the backing of ADB which has launched its own South Asian Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) since 2001 covering nearly 33 projects in areas such as energy, transport, trade facilitation and ITC. The second is the Chinese initiative, under its ‘Silk Road’ programme, called BCIM-EC (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor) which is the extension of the Chinese infrastructure connectivity projects to Myanmar and proposes linking up Kunming, Yangon, Mandalay to Chittagong, Dhaka and Sylhet and Kolkata; it also proposes to cover north-eastern states in general and Manipur and Barak Valley of Assam in particular. The first joint working group has already met in Kunming, the provincial capital of Yunnan, China, to consider identifying realistic and achievable infrastructure projects to expand physical connectivity. In a way, this is an extension of the Chinese infrastructure projects in Myanmar where they have laid road and gas pipelines and have developed the ports of Sitwe and Kyaukpyu.

What is the current international context of India's 'Act East Policy'? When it was launched, in 1991 at the end of the Cold War, it was a major diplomatic accomplishment of the then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in so far as it was a complete turnaround in India’s foreign relations. From a stage of relatively benign neglect of ASEAN and of total isolation of Myanmar, the Narasimha Rao government launched a policy of active engagement with the Southeast Asia and East Asia, including South Korea, Japan and China. In this Indian effort, the ASEAN countries were fully supportive. As they were putting together a regional architecture, being devised after the withdrawal of US from the region, they saw India's presence as a balancer to China’s. The broad engagement at government level and in the form of people-to-people contacts, led to closer relations and broader awareness of each other and even help in India's own economic liberalisation. Since that beginning nearly a quarter century ago, the international circumstances have become more complex today although the rationale for both sides to continue with their policies has become stronger still.

Since that time, the global economic crises have propelled China to be a major regional and global economic driver and to political and military significance with all its attendant issues and disputes. In 2015, US is back, militarily, in the region, in part, because Chinese policies have made the ASEAN countries uneasy and China’s tensions in Japan have brought the geo-strategic stability to the brink. The pattern of economic engagement with China has changed too; as it gets richer and its desire for raw material gets even more ravenous, it is building a series of infrastructure projects on land and on sea in close proximity to its territory but, also, farther afield; and, now, these initiatives are entirely being driven by China alone and not in concert with any individual or multilateral organizational partner. Its presence in our region and in those in our close proximity, is a significant factor which requires careful management given the adversarial aspects of it; and, the fact remains that other countries are welcoming of its presence. So, in an atmosphere of exacerbating global tensions, with India being seen as close to US, the regional countries see both India and China as balancing each other. Overall, the situation makes for careful, nimble handling in the interest of India's own larger socio-economic progress and peace and to prevent it from taking a turn for the worse.

What is the role of the north-eastern states and what should it be? Ever since the launch of the 'Look East Policy’ but, most importantly, in recent times especially since the opening up of Myanmar, the success of this policy hinges on the full involvement of the north-eastern states. The reason for that is that India’s influence with South-East Asia cannot be tangible unless it takes advantage of the opening of the neighbouring economies with the help of various connectivity projects. Equally, this is critical to the growth of the north-eastern states themselves who suffered the adverse consequences of partition in 1947 due to the disruption of road, rail and port links. It is here that a major effort is required so that the north-eastern states can feel a sense of ownership of the LEAP and of being major stakeholders in this policy. The east-west orientation of these connectivity projects also has a strategic significance when the north-south orientation of infrastructure connectivity of China with its bordering regions is considered; China's bordering regions have, in fact, become appendages of the Chinese mainland economy as they provide the raw material and the Chinese economy provides the finished goods as a result of which there is no sophistication in these border economies. And, this east-west connectivity orientation would have a different kind of economic driver and development in which both Japan and US are interested. Moreover, the Indian model of economic cooperation with foreign countries is different as it aims at developing indigenous industrial and skills’ capacities of the target partner country.

The north eastern states’ current lack of involvement is recognised by everybody. And, perhaps, it would continue until the major infrastructure projects in the region, including in the north-eastern part of India itself, become fully operational; the interconnectivity within the region is also extremely critical for ensuring equal benefit to all the states. Since the connectivity is, barely, existing, the institutional framework for a robust economic engagement of the north-eastern states with Myanmar and the rest of South-East Asia, and it, eventually, linking up to the rest of India, does not exist at present. There are issues with regard to border management, inadequate capacity of border custom posts, the challenges of illegal migration, terrorism flows, drugs, arms supplies and others non-traditional security threats affecting the region.

The entire approach entails timely completion of the major infrastructure projects and the building of the institutional framework for the economic and socio-cultural engagement of the north-eastern states with the neighbouring countries in ASEAN as well as the China and Bangladesh. There are three major transport arteries under consideration, namely, Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project connecting the Myanmar port of Sitwe up to Mizoram border, Trilateral Highway connecting India with Myanmar and Thailand along a southern axis which is proposed to be extended up to Lao PDR and Cambodia, and, Economic Corridor along a northern road axis of India-Myanmar-Lao PDR-Vietnam-Cambodia; the governments of India and Myanmar are also working on a rail link along the Trilateral Highway axis. They are also plans to develop maritime connectivity in northern Bay of Bengal with direct shipping service between India and Myanmar having started in October, 2014, as well as to develop coastal shipping. Similarly, there are parallel discussions amongst governments regarding the creation of a facilitative regulatory framework for easier movement of people and goods consistent with the protection of the country’s national interests. The objective, naturally, is to develop economic corridors along the axial connectivity projects so as to encourage greater cooperation in the development of sectors such as SME, education, health centres media and power as well as the development of food/fruit processing sector. The strategy could, indeed, be to use the economic base in the north-eastern states for export to Myanmar as well as for setting up of production units in its SEZs to access the ASEAN markets.

However, one may need to keep in mind that the ASEAN economy is not in a buoyant phase so as to directly impact on the growth of these economic corridors even when they do, actually, come into existence. In that sense, the buoyancy of the Chinese economy is greater and, therefore, the current pattern of economic growth is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Still, the extent of spread of Chinese economic linkages in the region may not be as smooth as envisaged because of the presence of several negative local factors, including, governance issues, law and order conditions and the lack of institutional stability. The Indian attraction, nevertheless, remains strong because the leaderships in the ASEAN countries bordering China do feel the need to move out of China’s shadow for historical reasons. I feel that, if we develop our policies right, the north-eastern region, with its HR talent pool and command over English language and with an enriched educational base, can play a significant role in the growth of Myanmarese, Laotian, Cambodian and, even, the Vietnamese economies by building up capacities in the sectors mentioned earlier. Leveraging of IT, through the E-connectivity networks (merely as an illustration) well as of our national/regional media to enter the mainstream discourse in these countries would make considerable impact because these countries have an interest in learning from India's development model.

There is clear recognition both at the centre and at the regional level that the north-eastern states should be fully involved in the shaping of the central government's 'Act East Policy' because they are, now, are at its centre of gravity. There is need for all programmes of the government, under this policy, to have a regional aspect. The North Eastern Council should be better engaged with ASEAN. The think tanks from the north-eastern region should also be part of the think tank network of ASEAN. The north eastern universities, such as the University of Nagaland, should be part of the university network with ASEAN. There should be institutional arrangements with MEA and the latter should consider opening a branch secretariat at one of the north-eastern state’s capital to cover the entire region.

I would like to thank you once again and would be delighted to take your questions or comments.